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This paper examines opportunities for Sub-Saharan African countries to effectively 
participate in globalization, particularly given the increasing interest of China and 
India in Sub-Saharan Africa. How could Sub-Saharan Africa fully engage and gain 
benefits from global network trade? Over the last 15 years Asia has become Africa’s 
fastest growing export market. Asian countries are much more open to trade than Europe 
or America. There seems to be no evidence to suggest that this trend will not continue in 
the near future. We acknowledge the numerous caveats in Asia’s growing interest in the 
African continent; not least the “resource curse” of exports that are heavily concentrated 
on oil, minerals and raw materials, as well as the fierce competition from Asia’s cheap 
manufactured exports. However, we believe that there is strong evidence to suggest a clear 
potential for South-South cooperation in trade and investment. Drawing on evidence from 
our extensive research into international value chains, we identify five “critical factors” 
for effective participation in global network trade: price, speed-to-market, labor 
productivity, flexibility and product quality. Underlying competitive performance of 
these critical factors are a country’s policies and institutions. Effective policies, efficient 
institutions and the necessary infrastructure will ensure the best outcome for trading 
countries. In order to improve the depth and sustainability of these five critical factors, it is 
critical that developing countries create a supportive policy and institutional framework 
from the outset. 
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 “Africa looks to China and sees success: according to the World 
Bank, the Chinese have lifted 400 million of their own people out 
of poverty in the past two decades. All the while, no one forced the 
Chinese government to have elections or allow its opponents to 
start newspapers. […] The Chinese come to Africa as equals, with 
no colonial hangover, no complex relationship of resentment. 
China wants to buy; Africa has something to sell. If African 
governments could respond in a way which spreads the new wealth 
– a large if, of course – then China might provide an opportunity 






1.  Introduction: Africa’s Position in International Trade Today 
 
Africa has seen its share of international trade decline ever since the end of World 
War II (figure 1). The poorest continent is rich in natural resources such as 
minerals, timber and oil, but trade with the rest of the world is often complicated 
due to rundown infrastructure, political instability, poor governance and the 
disastrous impact of HIV-AIDS on the working age population.
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Figures 1 & 2 
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Source: Derived from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2005 
 
Historically, Africa has had strong trade ties with Europe. This process of 
cooperation formally started when the first Yaoundé Agreement was signed in 
1963 as a mark of European solidarity and to foster economic cooperation with 
French-speaking Africa. With the accession of the United Kingdom into the EEC, 
the agreement was widened to include 46 ACP (Africa – Caribbean – Pacific) 
countries, and the Lomé Convention replaced the earlier agreement. In 2000, the 
E.U. and Africa signed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which regulates 
ACP-EU cooperation for the next twenty years. The other large world market, the 
                                                 
2 Lindsey Hilsum, “We Love China,” Granta: The View from Africa, January 2006. Online 
available at: http://www.granta.com/extracts/2616 
3 British Broadcasting Cooperation, Africa’s Economy, online available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/africa/05/africa_economy/html/trade.stm (accessed on 
5/30/2006)  
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United States, also has a preferential trading agreement with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
signed into law in 2000 as AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act). The 
Act offers many tangible incentives to African countries in an effort to “continue 
their efforts to open up their economies and build free markets.”
4 
 
Many countries that have seen rapid growth over the last fifteen years (especially 
in Asia) have done so by making the transition from labor-intensive, low-value-
added production (e.g. agricultural products, primary commodities) into higher 
stages of the value chain, i.e. capital-intensive, high-value-added products (e.g. 
manufactured products, automotive parts). Sub-Saharan Africa hardly figures in 
exports of apparel to the US and EU markets (Figures 3 and 4). There are no 
African countries represented in the top 25 exporters to the U.S. market (Egypt is 
27
th, Lesotho is 30
th and Kenya 32
nd – all with less than 0.4% of market share). 
The same is true for the European market.
5 Both in Europe and America, African 
producers have seen growing competition from the emerging economic giants in 
Asia (e.g. China, India, but also Bangladesh) – even after taking into account their 
respective preferential trading agreements, Cotonou and AGOA. 
 
The same picture emerges if we look at the world’s main exporters of automotive 
parts. The only Sub-Saharan African country represented in the top-50 exporters 
is South Africa. 
 
Figures 3 & 4 

















Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel and European Union, 
Eurostat. 
 
Oil still dominates exports from Sub-Saharan Africa, together with primary 
commodities such as platinum, diamonds, and cocoa. The only exception is 
woven and knit apparel. If Sub-Saharan Africa wants to move up in the value 
                                                 
4 http://www.agoa.gov/ 
5 With the exception of North Africa: Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt  
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chain and increase its overall value added, it will have to diversify its production, 
and move out of traditional primary commodities into manufactured goods. 
 
 
2.  Asia’s Growing Interest in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
A.  Analytical Framework: Trade, Investment, Aid 
 
Although Sub-Saharan Africa’s total trade with Asia is relatively small by 
comparison with its trade with Europe and the United States (see figure 2 above), 
it has grown at an incredibly rapid pace, especially from 2001 onwards (figure 5). 
Indeed, Asia has become Sub-Saharan Africa’s fastest growing export market 
destination almost overnight, growing more than 10% on average during the last 
fifteen years. Since 1995, we have witnessed a “genuine reorientation” of Africa’s 
export towards the Asian Drivers, with falling importance of its traditional 
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Source: World Bank Group, Africa Region, Private Sector Unit, Summary of Patterns of Africa-
Asia Trade and Investment, Note Number 1, September 2005 
 
China, for a variety of reasons, catches the eye when looking at Africa-Asia 
trends over the last five years. Although in 2004 only 2% of Chinese trade was 
with Africa, the continent has done particularly well as China opened up to the 
world, with Africa-China bilateral trade growing more than 700% between 1991 
and 2002. Since the first China-Africa Forum in Beijing in 2000, bilateral trade 
has grown to more than $20bn over the four years to the end of 2004. Chinese 
imports from Africa concentrate on primary commodities; extractive mining and 
forestry in particular make up the bulk of African exports to China. The picture in 
India is very different: India’s share in Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports has actually 
fallen and remains at low levels of 2%. Apart from crude oil, metals and woods, 
the other significant Chinese imports from Africa are cotton from Cameroon and 
                                                 
6 Andrea Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud, Helmut Reisen and Xiaobao Chen, “The Rise of China and 
India: What’s in it for Africa?” OECD, Development Centre Studies, May 2006, pp. 45-47  
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Although China’s thirst for African oil (especially from Nigeria, Sudan and 
Angola) is well-reported, it has to be mentioned that the 674 Chinese state 
companies involved in Africa have also invested in booming sectors such as 
copper mines, fishing, construction and telecommunications. In 2004, Chinese 
investments represented $900m of the $15bn of FDI in Africa.
8 
 
Kaplinsky et al point out that there is a danger of overestimating the historic and 
present impact, and underestimating the potential future impact of China’s rise on 
Sub-Saharan Africa. By creating a synthetic framework distinguishing three 
primary channels of transmission – trade, FDI, and aid – Kaplinsky allows us to 
focus on the “complementary-competitive” dimensions as well as on the direct 
and indirect impacts. This primary focus of this paper is on trade links.
9 
 
Table 1: Kaplinsky’s Synthetic View of the China-Africa Trade Channel 
 
   Direct  Indirect 
Complementary 
 
-inputs for industries 
-cheap consumer 
goods 
-higher global prices 





existing and potential 




external markets – 
falling prices and 
falling market shares 
Source: Kaplinsky et al, “The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa,” April 2006, p. 25 
 
Table 1 above sums up the threats and opportunities facing Africa caused by this 
growing Asian interest. On the one hand, there are direct and indirect 
‘complementary’ effects of Africa-Asia trade, which should be seen as 
opportunities. But on the other hand, there are direct and indirect ‘competitive’ 
effects which might threaten Africa’s future economic development. 
 
B.  Threats 
 
It is useful to keep in mind that China has predominantly imported only a limited 
number of products – mostly oil, minerals and precious metals – and that from a 
small number of Sub-Saharan countries. In return, it primarily exports 
                                                 
7 Ibid. and UN Comtrade Database, UN Statistics Division, 2006 – own calculations 
8 Jean-Christophe Servant, “China’s trade safari in Africa,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2005. 
Online available at : http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica 
9 Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, “The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa,” Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, April 2006. Available online at: 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/AsianDriverpdfs/DFIDAgendaPaper06.pdf  
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manufactured goods, most of them final consumption goods.
10 This is, of course, 
not an unfamiliar story in international development and represents a particular 
threat to Africa’s nascent manufacturing sector. The outlook is not entirely bleak 
although there is considerable evidence that domestic manufacturers in some 
African countries are being squeezed by China-sourced imports, especially in the 
clothing and furniture sectors. Also, although there is no doubt that a boom in 
commodity prices could favor certain Sub-Saharan economies; it also poses 
severe problems of economic management: if poorly handled, it could easily 
become a “resource-curse.”
11 Outside of clothing and textiles, there seems to be 
little trade between China and Sub-Saharan Africa in intermediate goods, let alone 
clear signs of major cooperation in coordinated global value chains. 
 
C.  Opportunities 
 
The opportunity for Sub-Saharan African countries from a mounting Chinese 
commercial interest is an area well-worth examining. Both China and India have 
seen a growing middle class over the last decade with increasing purchasing 
power, and an avid appetite for imported goods. This means that China and India 
are not just big potential markets for African goods. Compared to the United 
States, Japan and the European Union, China is a much more open economy than 
Africa’s traditional markets in the West. Imports into China as a percentage of 
GDP constitute more than 25%, while the equivalent ratio for the U.S., the E.U. 
and Japan is but 15%, 14% and 11% respectively.
12 Furthermore, Chinese and 
Indian trade involvement in Africa also creates the possibility of ‘spillovers’ 
through the attraction of foreign direct investment in infrastructure, and through 
technology and skills transfers. 
 
The central concern for Sub-Saharan Africa is whether they can successfully 
leverage this new-found bargaining power in order to be a more pro-active player 
in global network trade. First and foremost, Sub-Saharan Africa needs to start by 
getting its own house in order – i.e. the policies, institutions and trade-enabling 
physical infrastructure that will be the critical foundations for any future export-
oriented economic growth. There already is plenty of anecdotal evidence of 
Chinese direct investment in roads and transport infrastructure as well as power 
generation.
13 Chinese firms are also setting up plants in Africa (especially in 
apparel) in order to circumvent restrictive quota regimes and enjoy free market 
access to the European Union via Cotonou and the United States via AGOA (one 
good example is Lesotho). Another favorable aspect of South-South investment is 
that developing countries tend to be less risk averse and more willing to deal with 
                                                 
10 Africa’s top 10 exports are crude oil (37%), diamonds (6%), platinum (3%), gold (2%), coal 
(2%), cocoa beans (2%), motor cars (2%), ferro-alloys (1.5%), aluminum (1.3%) and cotton 
(1.2%). Africa’s top 10 imports are ships and boats (4%), passenger motor cars (3.5%), motor 
vehicle parts (2.4%), medicaments (2.3%), crude oil (2%), radio transmitters (1.4%), cotton 
fabrics (1.3%), rice (1.2%), wheat (1.1%) and electric appliances (0.9%). 
11 Goldstein et al, “The Rise of China and India,” pp. 69-74 
12 IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2006 
13 Hilsum, “We Love China,” Granta, p. 1-6  
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the informal governance arrangements and processes found in many African 
countries. Arguably, they may even be more likely to press for improved 
governance and infrastructure to lower their own risk, compared to investors from 




The Kenyan cut flower industry offers one promising example for future Africa-
Asia cooperation. Traditionally, the majority of Kenyan cut flowers are exported 
to the Netherlands, where they are sold in auction houses and are then re-exported 
to large markets in the United States or Japan. This rather convoluted process 
contributes to a much shorter vase life of Kenyan flowers. An emergent trend in 
the industry is direct sales to supermarket chains, which seem keen to cut out the 
auction houses and buy directly from flower farms abroad. The African producers 
really are the main beneficiary of this new trend. For supermarkets, African 
flowers are attractive because they are inexpensive and their growers are willing 
to accept a fixed price. To the African growers the arrangement is beneficial as 
well because supermarkets buy large quantities at fixed prices.
15 The commercial 
challenge for Kenya is to “cut out the Dutch middleman” and sell directly in 
Japan’s more than $10bn flower market. This Kenyan example could perhaps 
even be expanded to the whole horticultural sector in Africa, promoting direct 
sales of fresh fruit and vegetables to Asian (and European) supermarkets. 
 
A second concrete opportunity for Africa-Asia cooperation is tourism. With rising 
middle classes in China and India looking to spend a significant part of their 
increasing disposable incomes on holidays, there is clear potential for Africa to 
reap the benefit. Through positioning itself as a relatively close and attractive 
holiday destination, the gain for Sub-Saharan Africa could not just be direct (in 
tourism services, hotels, restaurants, etc.) but also indirect: the fact that more and 
more direct flights arrive in African airports makes transport cheaper and Asian 
markets more readily accessible for African goods. One clear case of a potential 
tourism winner is Mozambique, which has far from attained its tourism potential 
and will be discussed more in detail below. 
 
However, all of the factors that would make Sub-Saharan African exports 
competitive in Europe or the United States – especially price, speed-to-market, 
labor productivity, flexibility, and product quality – are equally if not more 
important in the fiercely competitive Asian markets. In the next section, we will 
address these “critical factors” in more detail and underline their importance 
given the changing nature of international trade and the emergence of global 
production networks as the dominant source of international trade. 
                                                 
14 Stephen Gelb, “South-South Investment: The Case of Africa,” from Africa in the World 
Economy: The National, Regional, and International Challenges. Fondad, The Hague, December 
2005 
15 ILO, The World Cut Flower Industry: Trends and Prospects, Sector Publications. Online 
available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/ctflower/139e3.htm  
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3.  The Changing Structure of International Trade: From Comparative 
Advantage to Global Trade Networks 
 
The rise in trade in intermediate goods in manufacturing constitutes a 
fundamental shift in the structure of international trade and poses a challenge to 
classical economists’ understanding of how countries fit into the international 
division of labor. In the traditional theory of international trade, the direction of 
trade (i.e. which countries produce what goods for export) is determined by the 
principle of comparative advantage. According to this principle, countries will 
specialize in the production and export of the good or goods for which its relative 
productivity advantage exceeds that of the foreign country.
16 
 
A radically different notion of comparative advantage emerges if we focus more 
generally on the changes in the structure of international trade over the last 20 
years; in particular the rise in intermediate goods in overall international trade, 
whether it is done within firms as a result of FDI or through arm’s length 
subcontracting.
17 Such intermediate goods trade has risen more rapidly than trade 
in final goods, and it is the defining manifestation of globalized production, or 
what has variously been termed “outsourcing”; the “international disintegration of 
production” (Feenstra, 1998), “the slicing up of the value chain” (Krugman, 
1995), “global production sharing” (Yeats, 2001), “the international integration of 
production” (UNCTAD, 1993), and the “rise of global production networks” 
(Ernst et al, 2002), or “global value chains” (Sturgeon, 2001).
18 
 
In order to take advantage of globalization, and foster economic growth through 
international trade (Dollar & Kraay, 2001), it is essential for countries to have 
access to or be integrated in international production networks. In spite of the 
many opportunities offered by globalization, Sub-Saharan African countries, with 
the only exception of South Africa, do not figure prominently – if at all – in these 
global production networks. In order to get a better understanding of where 
exactly the opportunities for Africa lie, it is helpful to analyze country-level 
industry value chains and compare industry performance with their direct 
international competitors. 
 
Through the multiple value chain studies that have been conducted on several 
sectors/ industries, we have identified five “critical factors” which determine the 
success of a country’s industry in reaping the benefits from global network trade: 
price, speed-to-market, labor productivity, flexibility, and product quality. 
                                                 
16 See David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817 and the 
“Heckscher-Ohlin” Theory of International Trade, in most standard economics textbooks, for 
example in Appleyard and Field, International Economics, Fourth Edition, Irwin McGraw, 2001 
17 Robert Feenstra, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Fall 1998 
18 William Milberg, “The Changing Structure of International Trade Linked to Global Production 
Systems: What Are the Policy Implications?” ILO, Policy Integration Department, Working Paper 
No. 33, May 2004  
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-Price.  The first and core critical factor is rather obvious. Figure 6 below 
compares the price of a T-shirt in four countries. It is no surprise that China has a 
clear competitive advantage, while lowering the price of its goods is one of the 
main challenges for Africa (the price in Kenya is more than three times the price 
in China). 
 












China Mexico Honduras Kenya
 
Source: Uma Subramanian, “Being Competitive: Value Chain Analysis and Solution Design,”  
IFC – World Bank Group, April 2006 
 
-Speed-to-Market.  Especially land-locked African countries are at a huge 
disadvantage here; although the African continent as a whole suffers with regards 
to this indicator, especially when we look at supplying the U.S. market (where 
there is fierce competition from Central America & Asia) and the European 
market (strong competition from Eastern Europe & countries from the former 
Soviet Union, but increasingly also Asia). Since growing value is being placed on 
fast order-to-delivery cycles, trade-related institutions and physical infrastructure 
are of crucial importance to be able to compete successfully in global markets. 
This is illustrated in figures 7 and 8 below, which compares the time it takes to 
import and export goods into various African countries and its competitors. 
 
Figures 7 & 8 





































Source: World Bank & IFC, Doing Business in 2006, Creating Jobs, pp. 104-106  
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-Labor Productivity.  A combination of poor education (both in terms of quality 
and overall coverage), deficient training, weak skills and a lack of entrepreneurial 
incentives puts Africa at a huge disadvantage compared to the rest of the world 
(figure 9). In addition to low investment in human capital, many African countries 
have difficulty retaining highly educated workers or attracting skilled expatriates. 
 
























Source: Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran, “Business Environment and Comparative Advantage in 
Africa: Evidence from the Investment Climate Data,” Center for Global Development, Working 
Paper 56, 2005 
 
-Flexibility.  Firms need to be responsive to the buyer’s ever-changing needs and 
be able to deliver accordingly (be it small or large orders) as well as in a timely 
manner. Apart from South Africa and Mauritius, which produce high value-added 
products, most Sub-Saharan African countries’ manufactured exports are basic 
products that are vulnerable to lower-cost Asian production in general.
19 It is hard 
to pin down a specific indicator that can measure flexibility. One possible way is 
through surveys with the buyers, asking them for a detailed assessment of their 
producer’s performance. Flexibility could be broken down into “coping with 
small orders” and “coping with changes in large orders.” In general, Africa 
performs rather poor compared to its competitors from Asia and Latin America.
20 
 
-Product Quality.  A good indicator of product quality is the “defect rate” or the 
percentage of items returned by the buyer. Unfortunately, reliable data on these 
indicators are also scarce and rather incoherent. However, from the detailed value 
chain studies, we find that the defect rate in the Kenyan apparel industry is over 
                                                 
19 Harry Broadman (ed.), From Disintegration to Reintegration: Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union in International Trade, Chapter 7: Linkages between FDI and Trade Flows and 
Gereffi (2005) 
20 Hubert Schmitz and Peter Knorringa, “Learning from Global Buyers,” IDS, University of 
Sussex, 2001  
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3% compared to Honduras where it is less than 1%.
21 Since the quality of the final 
product is also directly influenced by raw materials and inputs used in production, 
we could look at the quality of “purchased inputs that is of lower than agreed 
upon quality” as an indicator of overall quality. Figure 10 shows that this 
indicator is much higher for firms in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda compared to 
South Africa, India and China. It is also interesting to note that this issue is more 
serious for export-oriented firms in these countries, compared to the firms which 
mainly produce for domestic markets. 
 
 
Source: World Bank Group, Enterprise Survey, 2002 
 
 
4.  Value Chain Analyses 
 
The above-mentioned competitive factors are driven not only by industry-level 
efficiency but are directly affected by underlying government policies, institutions 
and physical infrastructure in the exporting countries (such as a trade facilitating 
environment, quality control systems, licensing). Value chain analyses can shed 
some light and provide clear insights on where the opportunities for Africa lie. 
Trade-enabling policies and regulations need to be addressed directly by the 
government in a comprehensive, coherent and integrated manner. 
 
While many firms have had international operations and trading relationships for 
decades, in recent years we have seen the formation of global-scale economic 
systems which are tightly integrated and often managed on a day-to-day basis. It 
is therefore hard to imagine that today’s process of economic development could 
be isolated from these global production systems. 
 
Gereffi (1999) makes a distinction between buyer-driven and producer-driven 
global supply chains.
22 The former denotes the case of global buyers creating a 
supply base upon which production and distribution systems are built without 
                                                 
21  World Bank Group, Value Chain Studies of Honduras and Kenya, 2005 
22 Gary Gereffi, “International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain,” 
Journal of International Economics 48, no. 1, June 1999, pp. 37-70 
Figure 10: Quality Reputation (% of purchased products that is of lower 
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direct ownership. Most common examples are apparel (e.g. Wal-Mart), furniture 
(e.g. Ikea) and footwear (e.g. Nike); i.e. labor intensive consumer goods.  In 
producer-driven chains, manufacturers of higher technology products like 
automobiles and computers are the key economic agents that control relations 
with suppliers of intermediate components, and forward links with distribution 
and retailing services. The lead firms in producer-driven chains usually belong to 
large international oligopolies. 
 
Before focusing on these “networks” however, we will first focus on primary 
commodities (by far Africa’s greatest source of foreign currency revenue through 
trade). Afterwards, we will consider specific cases of buyer-driven and producer-
driven supply chains, ending with one specific case of services network chains: 
the tourism industry. For each of these value chain analyses, this paper will try to 
emphasize the public policies that were either lacking or instrumental in the 
performance of the various industries. After all, in some sectors, certain steps that 
were or were not taken by the government have been decisive in determining a 
sector’s relative competitive success or weakness. 
 
 
A.  Primary Commodities: Ghana (pineapple), Kenya (flowers) and Nigeria 
(shrimp) 
 
a. Ghana: Pineapple 
 
Pineapple exports are currently leading the horticultural sector in Ghana. 
Commercial cultivation of pineapple for export is a relatively recent phenomenon 
in the West-African country; it only really took off with the introduction of sea-
freighting in the mid-1990s. Prior to 1995, nearly all exported pineapples were 
transported by airfreight. With the creation of the exporters’ association SPEG – 
‘Sea-freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana’ – sea freighting of pineapples in 
reefer vessels for exports to the European market steadily grew in importance. In 
1995 a mere 2700 tons were shipped, whilst in 2004 a total of 48,000 tons of 
pineapple were freighted by sea from Ghana to Europe.
23 In the same period the 
volume of airfreight pineapple was reduced from well over 10,000 tons in 1995 
and 1996 to around 6,000 tons in 2002. 
 
The fresh pineapple production sector comprises thousands of small-scale farmers 
and several large-scale plantation growers. Even though there are several active 
associations, the pineapple sub-sector is still not sufficiently organized and 
streamlined to achieve sufficient volume of production, thereby enjoying the 
benefits of economies of scale and increased negotiation power. The pineapple 
sub-sector in Ghana will not be able to capitalize on the market opportunities in 
Europe if the following interrelated issues are not addressed: low quality, low 
volume of product, high shipping costs. Especially the last factor makes it difficult 
                                                 
23 Source: SPEG 2005  
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to compete with Costa Rica and Cote d’Ivoire, the two major players in the 
European market. 
 
The  adjacent   graph  provides  an    Figure 11: Pineapple Value Chain Analysis 
overview of the cost structure for 
Ghanaian fresh pineapple 
freighted by sea and by air 
compared to fresh pineapples 
from its main competitors Costa 
Rica and Cote d’Ivoire. In this 
graph the CIF prices per unit of 
product from the various 
countries subdivided for the 
various cost factors are compared. 
 
It is immediately clear that the sea 
freight costs are much higher in 
Ghana than in the two other 
countries, thus contributing to its 
fragile market position in the 
European Union, which is 
primarily based on low cost for 
low quality. 
     Source: Frank Joosten, Agribusiness VCA Ghana
24 
 
The two primary objectives for the Ghanaian pineapple export sector to be more 
competitive should focus on Price and Product Quality. Measures that would 
lead to (1) increased production volume would reduce prices through economies 
of scale and (2) enhanced standards would lead to higher product quality and 
bigger profit margins. Elements of international “cost leadership” are achieved in 
the pineapple supply chain by a combination of qualitative improvement (higher 
standards through accreditation, ISO9001 and HACCP) and standardization of 
steps and procedures within the chain. 
 
Given the increasing emphasis of European importers on safety and quality 
assurance systems there is a growing need for technical support and inspection 
services among exporting businesses. These services are currently available in 
Ghana from international service providers which are accredited, but are 
expensive under Ghanaian conditions. Local business service providers that can 
instruct and certify agri-food companies for the establishment of for example 
HACCP-systems, EurepGAP, BRC, etc. are not available. The possibilities of 
introducing a general quality standard for exportable fresh produce from Ghana 
(‘Ghana GAP’?) that is recognized by Eurep and several of the other main 
                                                 
24 Frank Joosten, IAC Wageningen UR and George S. Ayernor, University of Ghana, 
“Agribusiness Value Chain Analysis: Ghana MSME Project,” Final report for the IFC – World 





























systems in Europe are currently explored by a working group of GSB and the 
National Horticultural Taskforce. Development, recognition and sector-wide 
establishment of such quality systems is, however, likely to take several years. 
 
 
b. Kenya: Cut Flowers  
 
The cut flower industry has overtaken coffee and tourism as a source of foreign 
exchange for Kenya and now ranks second only to tea, according to the Kenya 
Flower Council.
25 Over the years, Kenya has become the European Union’s 
biggest source of fresh flower imports and has overtaken Israel as the market 
leader. It has a 25% market share, beating Colombia and Israel which have to be 
content with each 16%. Two-thirds of the Kenyan blooms go to the Netherlands, 
which dominates the trade in cut flowers worldwide through its auction halls 
where Dutch wholesalers buy flowers for re-export to markets as far away as the 
United States and Japan. 
 
In Kenya, increased air travel for tourism reduced the cost of airfreight to Europe 
and provided new transport opportunities for small quantities of fresh products. 
Tourism also increased local demand for high quality fruit and vegetables and 
provided an outlet for produce not meeting export standards. A key success factor 
is the involvement of a variety of private institutions and marketing arrangements 
that allow for fast, flexible and reliable delivery of cut flowers to the foreign 
market. This success is even more remarkable given the relatively high air freight 




One of the problems in the flower sector is that medium-scale exporters sell 100% 
of their consignment through the (mainly Dutch) auction system. As competition 
becomes increasingly stringent, support is required to identify and form linkages 
for medium-scale rose exporters to gain effective access into the direct  sales 
market. One clear trend is the sales of cut flowers through supermarkets. The 
successful entry of Kenyan cut flowers in the UK market is principally due to the 
fact that exporters are selling directly to supermarkets in pre-packs with ready 
labels and guaranteed vase life. In this new market segment, stringent quality 
control, packaging, labeling, and resources dedicated to marketing and client 
relations are a must.
27 
 
                                                 
25 Kenya Flower Council, Industry Information and Market Data. Online Available at: 
http://www.kenyaflowers.co.ke/industryinfo/marketdata.php 
26 World Bank  (2005) “Kenya Growth and Competitiveness”. 
27 Jaffee, Steven. 1995. “The Many Faces of Success: the Development of Kenyan Horticultural 
Exports”, in Steven Jaffee and John Morton, eds. Marketing Africa’s High-Value Foods. 319-374. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
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A critical point is that Kenyan exports – which are 2-5 days old – must compete 
directly with local and regional producers at the auction house. From there, it then 
has to be redistributed to various points of sales, which taxes the vase life of a 
flower. Consequently, to avoid the few extra days in getting cut flowers to a 
consumer, direct sales could drastically reduce the “farm-to-vase” time. Unlike 
African and Israeli exporters, producers in Latin America have already taken a 
direct sales approach rather than relying on the auction system. In this context, 
Latin American exporters seek out firms with distribution channels that reach 
both wholesale and retail markets. This strategy allows farmers to know the 
market price prior to delivery, assuming that they guarantee high quality. 
 
Kenyan cut flowers are overrepresented at the Dutch auction. As a result, this is 
having a gradual displacement effect on medium-scale exporters. This should be 
an impetus for Kenyan exporters to consider non-traditional markets in Asia. 
While the marketing strategy for Asian markets will differ, targeting niche 
markets in this region needs to be explored more aggressively. Especially if the 
Japanese market is strong and growing, there are clear benefits to be able to ship 
directly from Kenya instead of going via the auction houses in Amsterdam. As 
already mentioned earlier, the growing interest of supermarkets to buy directly 
from African growers is a clear opportunity to ‘cut out the middle man’ and 
directly supply the Japanese market. 
 
Unfortunately, the success of the Kenyan cut flower industry is mostly caused by 
large-scale growers and overshadows the often struggling small and medium-
sized producers who face a number of constraints where simple government 
measures could make a major difference. Small growers lack information about 
the latest growing methods, have poor equipment, use uneven quality of 
agrochemicals and face a shortage of surveillance and quality monitoring. 
Furthermore, the VAT rebate system is very inefficient: it is well known that 
100% of flowers are exported, but at the same time, all growers must pay VAT on 
their input materials and afterwards submit a claim for a rebate, which usually has 
a cycle of 6 to 12 months to be paid back. As a result of that long VAT repayment 
cycle, there has been a dramatic reduction in small growers’ re-investment in their 
physical facilities, which has gradually reduced the turnover of their production 
facilities. Given the absence of adequate financing, this is probably likely to force 
small and medium-sized growers into lower value-added flower production.  
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c. Nigeria: Shrimp 
 
In many respects, the Nigerian shrimp industry is a success story. Once a 
declining industry (about ten years ago), it is now an industry with a promising 
outlook and boasting a significant growth potential. Nigeria’s shrimp industry has 
been able to turn the tables because it has met international standards of quality 
and health safety, cultivated and captured a segment of the international market, 
built port-side facilities for its own use, provided high value added activities, and 
achieved profitability in spite of a high interest rate environment. The industry is 
confident about its future market opportunities and seems ready to expand the 
trawler fleet. 
 




















































Source: Nigeria Value Chain Analysis, 2005 
28  
 
Looking at figure 12, we can make the following observations: 
•  Fuel is a key cost driver at 36% of value added because it is used for 
vessel operation in the trawling activity; 
•  Administrative overhead costs are significant relative to other value 
adding inputs but consistent with local practice. Relative to labor cost, the 
figure reveals vividly the importance devoted to management and the level 
of effort spent in overseeing operations; 
•  Capital charge is also a large cost driver, but one that is fully recovered; 
•  Although logistics account for only 5% of the value adding inputs, an 
efficient cooling chain is essential for perishable exports. 
 
                                                 
28 The Nigeria Value Chain project was jointly managed by Uma Subramanian (FIAS, World 
Bank Group) and Peter Mousley (Africa Region, The World Bank).  
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The value added component of the shrimp chain provides ample room to cover 
both the primary input costs as well as the logistics costs. The profit rate is 18% 
of value added. This “success” is a turnaround for a previously declining industry 
and promises to be a major source of job creation and future export earnings.
29 
 
Two major factors in this positive result include the nature of the product – high 
value shrimp – as well as the production of quality goods – shrimp that meets 
international quality standards as determined by HACCP. The latter has enabled 
Nigerian shrimp producers to access high end European markets which are 
willing to pay premium prices for high quality goods, allowing them to meet the 
high costs of doing business yet make a decent profit. 
 
In essence, a shift to higher value products and higher quality goods has provided 
the Nigerian fish industry a chance to expand and provide positive returns. 
However, the industry is concerned with the long-term sustainability of the stock 
of wild shrimp, as the natural growth of wild stock is not anticipated to keep pace 
with the rate of harvesting. Regulatory controls will protect the stock but not 
likely help to increase the stock. Wild shrimp supply will act as the constraint to 
industry growth, unless alternative sources of harvesting are found. To this end, 
the industry may want to diversify. A promising alternative option may be farmed 
shrimp as a means of sustaining industry growth, a feasibility that is being 
contemplated by some of the trawling companies such as Atlantic Shrimpers. 
 
The Nigerian government has been influential in fostering growth in its national 
shrimp industry. The key factor for Nigeria has been to acquire the HAACP 
certificate that has opened up the European market. Thanks to the right policy 
implementation, Nigeria was included in the E.U. “Decision 2001/635/EC - Part 
1” list of countries in 2001; under this arrangement, the Federal Department of 
Fisheries of Nigeria was designated the Competent Authority or central point of 
responsibility. It is hard to imagine that the Nigerian shrimp industry would have 
been able to reverse its fate without E.U. market access. Furthermore, since 
demand for shrimp shows a clear growing trend and has a relatively 
straightforward value chain, it allowed for relatively easy integration of Nigerian 
shrimp production into the global value chain. 
 
 
B.  Buyer-Driven Supply Chains: Textile/Apparel Chains in Kenya & 
Lesotho 
 
a. Kenya: Apparel 
 
The performance of the Kenyan garment sector is highly dependent on exports to 
the United States under the AGOA agreement. The high levels of dependence on 
specific markets combined with an equally high dependence on imported material 
                                                 
29 USAID, Industry Action Plan for Nigerian Shrimp and Prawns, 2002. Online available at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/ng/downloads/markets/shrimp_and_prawns_industry_action_plan.pdf  
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makes the industry vulnerable to market fluctuations and disruptions. Very little 
evidence exists to suggest that the government and garment manufacturers are 
actively pursuing dialogue to develop an industrial strategy and vision to help 
diversify the market demand base, as well as a strategy to strengthen the entire 
cotton-to-garment supply chain. 
 
The lack of planning associated with market liberalization of the textile and 
garment sector in 1991 and its repercussions are reflected in the displacement of 
workers from the entire cotton-to-garment chain, and the consequent increase in 
the number of small and micro garment manufacturers, influx of under-declared 
fabric, dominance of second-hand garments in the economy, and the large number 
of people whose welfare is dependent on the growth of the second hand garment 
market. The weak position taken by the government to formulate a strategy to 
curtail the influx of second hand garment imports, while at the same time creating 
alternative employment opportunities in the formal garment manufacturing sector 
is dampening the potential growth of the entire cotton-to-garment industry in 
Kenya. This problem is reflected in the continued use of labor intensive 
production methods among domestic market oriented garment manufacturers, as 
well as the lack of new investments in rehabilitation activities in the sector. 
 
At the factory level, high rejection rates suggest the need for introducing and 
integrating modern management practices such as world class manufacturing 
methods and standard operating procedures. Low labor productivity could 
indicate (a) need for in-factory training, as well as weaknesses in the institutional 
support infrastructure to help enhance labor performance (b) distortions in labor 
policy such as rigidities in hiring and firing that could manifest itself in labor 
productivity measures. An apparel value chain comparison between Kenya and 
Honduras highlights many of the competitive challenges Kenya is facing (figure 
13) that are both policy based and market based.    
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Figure 13: Apparel Value Chain Comparison between Kenya and Honduras 
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Lower Labor Productivity
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Source: Uma Subramanian, “Being Competitive: Value Chain Analysis and Solution Design,” IFC 
– World Bank Group, April 2006 
 
At US $3.60, the FOB price of a plain cotton t-shirt from Kenya is over 2.5 times 
the FOB price of a similar t-shirt from Honduras.  What explains the difference in 
FOB price offered by firms in the two countries?  As highlighted in Figure 13, let 
us examine three elements that are much higher in Kenya than in Honduras.  Raw 
material costs, mostly imported fabric, for Kenya are almost 3 times that in 
Honduras. Both Kenya and Honduras are subject to trade agreements with the US 
– AGOA and CAFTA respectively. Apart from Kenya’s location that increases 
ocean freight costs, there are two other underlying issues that are not insignificant 
in explaining the difference:  (i) trade logistics costs for imports at $2325/TEU in 
Kenya is 3.5 times that of Honduras; 
30 (ii) tariff in Kenya on imported fabric at 
17.5% compared to 9.5% in Honduras. For a labor intensive sector such as 
apparel, would Kenya not have some comparative advantage given that Kenyan 
wages (at $9.40/labor day) on average are much lower than in Honduras 
($12/labor day)?  However, in monetary terms the labor cost for a t-shirt in Kenya 
is still higher than Honduras. This is really driven by lower labor productivity. On 
an average, Honduran firms produce twice as many shirts as Kenyan firms 
holding all other factors constant. Finally, outbound logistics costs (excluding 
ocean transportation costs) in Kenya are almost 4 times that in Honduras.  The 
                                                 
30 Doing Business 2007  
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cost difference is further exacerbated by the quality of product as reflected in 
reject rates of >3% shows Kenyan firm’s performance.  The example discussed 
here clearly illustrates that geography alone is not driving Kenyan apparel 
industry’s lower competitiveness in US markets; nor is lower labor costs 
compensating for other overriding constraints.     
 
b. Lesotho: Apparel 
 
The signing of AGOA has resulted in rapid growth of the textile and apparel 
industry in Lesotho.  The growth rate has been helped by the entry of Asian firms, 
to the point where the sector now contributes a huge share of overall output. What 
we are witnessing now is a process of growth led infrastructure as Chinese and 
Taiwanese investors demand improved infrastructure in transport, energy and 
water, all necessary for profitable operations in the sector. As a result, the 
government is beginning to address these issues with the help of donors.
31 
 
The textile and garments sector in Lesotho faces a double challenge: overcoming 
increased competition after the phasing out of the MFA in 2005, and dealing with 
the scheduled 2007 expiration of the special dispensation provision in AGOA. 
Right now, Lesotho is able to sell duty-free in the American market while at the 
same time buying cheap fabric from Asia. It is not clear if the sector will be able 
to survive past the 2007 expiration.
32 It is also not sure what will happen to the 
Taiwanese investors when they are no longer able to reap the benefits of the 
current arrangement. 
 
Figure 14: Value Added of African Textile Exports 
to the U.S. under AGOA
5.41































Source:  Value Chain Analysis of Selected Sectors in Lesotho, Consultant Report prepared for the 
World Bank, 2004 
 
                                                 
31 Stephen Gelb, “South-South Investment,” p. 204 
32 FIAS, “Competitiveness and Corporate Social Responsibility in Lesotho’s Apparel Industry” 
World Bank Group, June 2006  
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Lesotho is by far the only country that exports almost 100% of its apparel to the 
U.S. under AGOA terms.
33 But, as figure 14 above illustrates, exports from 
Mauritius – when measured in dollar value per square meter equivalent – are 
nearly 43% higher. Specifically, value per square meter equivalent for Lesotho is 
approximately $3.79, while for Mauritius, it is $5.41, and for Madagascar, $4.08. 
 
One advantage Lesotho currently has over many African countries is that it is one 
of the least developed countries in Africa with the highest labor standards. The 
reason for that is the close relationship Lesotho has developed with big 
international buyers (such as GAP and Levi’s) who require all their suppliers to 
comply with social and environmental standards in their codes of conduct. The 
Government of Lesotho is collaborating with the ILO on labor law reform and 
should take advantage of this collaboration by marketing Lesotho to the rest of the 
world as an international centre for socially responsible labor.
34 The question is, 
however, if that alone will suffice for the industry as a whole to survive. 
 
 
C.  Producer-Driven Supply Chains: Automotive Parts in South Africa 
 
Just like many formerly inward-oriented economies, South Africa’s industry 
started to face a radically new competitive environment as its trade barriers began 
to fall starting in the late 1980s.
35 The initial result of this reform in trade policy 
was a sharp increase in the trade deficit in the automobile and components sector 
of South Africa. In 1995, the South African government’s Motor Industry 
Development Program (MIDP) heralded a much-lauded shift in vision and aims. 
Its main objective was to improve the international competitiveness of firms in the 
industry, enhance growth through exports, and stabilize employment levels. In 
order to achieve these aims, a series of export-oriented incentives were 
introduced, coupled with a reduction in import tariffs between 1995 and 2002.
36 
 
Since the implementation of the MIDP, South Africa has seen rapid growth in the 
auto sector, based on a speedy rise in the exports of completely-built-up units 
(CBUs), especially after 1998. In addition to exports of CBUs, there was also a 
marked increase in the exports of direct car components. 
 
With respect to CBU exports, three German assemblers sourced large numbers of 
cars from South Africa to their global markets. BMW decided to specialize on the 
3-series car in order to obtain scale economies, and displaced local production of 
the 5- and 7-series with imports. Its exports of CBUs increased steadily from 
                                                 
33 Source: Africa Coalition for Trade, Inc. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Source: Barnes, J. and R. Kaplinsky, “Globalization and trade policy reform: whither the 
automobile components sector in South Africa?”, Competition and Change 4, 3 (2000), pp. 211-
243 
36 For the specifics on those export incentives, see Barnes, Kaplinsky and Morris, Industrial Policy 
in Developing Economies: Developing Dynamic Comparative Advantage in the South African 
Automobile Sector, May 2003  
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4,346 units in 1998 to 43,583 units in 2002. Its exports were destined for the 
North American, Australasian, European and Japanese markets. Volkswagen 
sourced an increasing number of Golf 4 cars for the UK and European markets, 
with these exports growing from 10,485 units in 1998 to 30,533 units in 2002. 
Daimler-Chrysler exported 36,324 C-Series Mercedes Benz’s to Japan, the UK 
and Australasia in 2002, a 20-fold increase on exports of only 1,752 vehicles in 
1998. Also, Toyota began exporting the Toyota Corolla to Australia and New 
Zeeland in April 2003. 
 
Component exports have also grown, particularly that of catalytic converters (48 
percent of total component exports in 2001) and leather seats (13 percent of the 
total). A major conduit for these exports were the non-German OEMs (original 
equipment manufacturers) who satisfied their need for duty credits by purchasing 
these from component suppliers, many of whom they eased into export market 
niches. Catalytic converters are an especially interesting case, since initially the 
level of value added was low. However, as scale built up, investment of more than 
2 billion rand (more than $200 million) were made into a deepening of the 
production process. In 2002, South Africa supplied 12 percent of the global 
catalytic converter market and was the most important supplier of catalytic 
converters to the European Union. 
 
What clearly drives South Africa’s relative success in the automotive industry is a 
supportive trade policy environment.  Additionally South Africa is by far the 
highest performer Sub-Saharan Africa with regards to several factors — 




D.  Services Supply Chains: Tourism in Mozambique 
 
Tourism is an industry which potentially could have a myriad of spillover effects 
for Sub-Saharan countries: transportation, enhanced infrastructure, transfers of 
technology, knowledge, and skills. As fast growth rates in the Chinese and Indian 
economies foster the creation of a growing Asian middle class, the opportunity for 
Africa in attracting tourists from that part of the world becomes greater. 
 
Mozambique is an interesting case, with underdeveloped potential. Since the 
1980s, the Government of Mozambique (GOM) has implemented many ‘first 
generation’ structural reforms such as adopting sound fiscal and monetary 
policies, privatizing public enterprises and liberalizing trade. The reforms have 
helped stabilize macroeconomic balances and supported the remarkable growth 
performance since 1992. In 2000, the GOM adopted the Action Plan for 
Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) as a medium-term rolling instrument 
incorporated into the public planning system. Tourism is seen as a priority area in 
which additional investment may create the jobs that are necessary to meet the 






























developing countries have increased market shares in international tourism.  Sub-
Saharan Africa, in particular, has experienced very strong growth in tourism 
within the last two decades – increasing its market share of global arrivals from 
1.5% in 1970 to 4.5% by 2003.
37 
 
Despite a strong tourism asset base and its geographic proximity to South Africa, 
one of the world’s top destinations, Mozambique still trails behind all its 
neighbors except for Malawi. Despite quite an impressive annual growth rate of 
13% (1999-2003), the average number of tourists per 100 inhabitants, at 2 for 
Mozambique is half of that of Africa’s average, and well below the world average 
of 11 per 100 inhabitants. Mozambique’s poor performance reflects problems 
with the country’s overall image, product variety and quality of tourists’ 
experiences. Realizing this potential depends substantially on the ability of all 
players in the Mozambique tourism value chain – from air service providers, to 
frontier agencies (e.g. for immigration and visas), hotels, tourism service 
providers, to other suppliers and government officials – to create and deliver high-
quality tourism experiences that can transform the country into a “must see” 
destination in Africa. 
 
Figure 15: Price Ranges of Tours for Competing Destinations in the Portuguese 
Market 
Source: FIAS & OECD, (2006), “The Tourism Sector in Mozambique: A Value Chain Analysis,” 
World Bank Group.  
 
Figure 15 illustrates Mozambique’s shortcomings. On the one hand, the country 
cannot compete with Brazil, Egypt, Cape Verde and Tunisia in the “low budget” 
market segment. And on the other hand, for “higher budget” travelers, it still 
cannot charge the premiums Mauritius and the Seychelles can charge. 
 
The requirements in turning Mozambique into a regional star for tourism are 
extremely high. First of all, the country needs to address its visa regulations. 
Many countries in its region don’t require visas at all from EU citizens (Mauritius, 
                                                 
37 FIAS and OECD (2006), “The Tourism Sector in Mozambique: A Value Chain Analysis,” 
World Bank Group.  
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Seychelles, and Maldives). There are also limited intercontinental flights from 
Europe and significant delays and hassles for tourists in airports. Second, there is 
weak presence of Mozambican tour operators in regional and global markets and 
limited collaboration between foreign and Mozambican tour operators. Third, 
there are no clear or concerted mechanisms to ensure the development and 
restoration of historic monuments and sites (e.g. Elephant reserve, Ilha da 
Mocambique, Ruins of the Bazaruto Fishing Pearls Company). 
 
Several areas for government action can be identified.
38 First of all, public 
investment in tourism development and marketing is small, especially when 
compared to competitors Kenya and South Africa. Furthermore, incentives for 
private investments in those areas are low given the inherent public goods nature 
of many tourism assets. Second, there is a week presence of domestic tourism 
operators in the industry. Mozambique has 8 active tour operators compared to 50 
in Uganda, 75 in Tanzania, and 220 in Kenya. Third, there is still limited 
coordination among the industry’s stakeholders. Airlines, hotels, tour operators, 
retailers, restaurants and a whole range of public sector agencies are not 
effectively working inter-sectorally to develop, promote and manage tourism 
destinations and more broadly, Mozambique’s image and positioning in world 
markets. Last, the roles and responsibilities among tourism related agencies will 
have to be clarified to avoid overlapping and efficiently allocate limited funds. 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid.  
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5.  Policy Implications 
 
Although there are numerous caveats in emerging Asia’s growing interest in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region, this paper has tried to focus on the opportunities for 
African countries to take advantage of the growing Asian giants in trying to leap 
into the global trade networks. It should be clear from the above analysis that a 
potential market in Asia does exist and will only grow in importance over the 
years to come. Over the last 15 years, Asia has already been Africa’s fastest 
growing export market, is much more open to trade than Europe and America, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that this trend will not continue in the near 
future. 
 
The five market-related success factors that were identified for effectively 
participating in global network trade – price, speed-to-market, labor productivity, 
flexibility, and product quality – are highlighted in the value chain studies. The 
underlying policies are even more critical: efficient institutions and the right 
infrastructure will allow countries to actually experience the success factors or 
“outcomes.” It is vital for developing countries to get a supportive policy and 
institutional regime in place along with the appropriate infrastructure, in order to 
be able to improve these critical factors. 
 
First of all, the example of Ghana’s pineapple industry illustrates the importance 
of product price in European markets. The only reason Ghana is even able to stay 
in the European pineapple market along competitors Costa Rica and Cote d’Ivoire 
is because of its significantly lower price, which it is forced to accept because of 
the lower quality of its product. However, Ghana faces a significant risk in this 
low price/low margin market unless it can ramp up quality as well as increase 
scale through appropriate policy support. On the other hand, Kenya’s apparel 
industry is in jeopardy because of its relatively high price compared to its major 
competitors from Asia and Central America. The high cost is driven mainly by 
raw material prices which are caused mainly by the “rule of origin” clause in the 
AGOA agreement. 
 
The second critical factor, speed-to-market, is crucial in the success of the 
Kenyan cut flower industry. The fact that there are several planes leaving Nairobi 
every day for its main markets in the European Union not only makes for fast 
delivery – an obvious competitive advantage – but also its high responsiveness, 
which directly relates to flexibility (the fourth factor). Kenya was one of the first 
African countries to privatize its airline industry in 1996; and more recently, with 
the signing of the Air Services Agreement between China and Kenya, Kenya 
Airways has been granted landing rights in several cities in China, which also 
agreed to cooperate in areas of information and telecommunications. Kenya 
Airways is now operating direct flights to Hong Kong and Guangzhou in southern 
China from Nairobi. Since Kenya was granted the Preferred Tourist Destination 
Status in 2004, arrivals from China have more than doubled and are expected to  
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grow even further. Similar to the policies with China, Kenya could seek other 
markets in East Asia such as Japan and South Korea. While Kenya has pushed for 
reasonable progress in its airfreight, much remains to be done when it comes to 
land/ocean based freight. For a typical apparel shipment the order-to-delivery 
cycle is more than 30 days in Kenya compared to less than 15 days in Honduras 
(Figure 13). It takes 25 days to export a 20 foot container in comparison to 5 days 
for Hong Kong and 6 days for Malaysia.
39 In addition to improving physical 
infrastructure, Kenya needs to improve trade institutions and procedures for 
smooth and low cost trade transactions and border transfers. 
 
The third factor, labor productivity explains why South Africa is the only 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa to participate in producer-driven network trade. 
Combined with high labor productivity, the South African government introduced 
a series of export-oriented incentives, coupled with a reduction in import tariffs 
between 1995 and 2002 under the MIDP. Since its implementation, there has been 
rapid growth in the automobile sector, based on a speedy rise in the exports of 
completely-built-up units (CBUs), especially after 1998. In addition to exports of 
CBUs, there was also a marked increase in the exports of direct car components. 
On the other hand, labor productivity is a major weakness for the Kenyan apparel 
industry, especially when compared with Honduras. While Kenyan wages are 
lower than Honduras, labor cost for producing one T-shirt in Kenya is 1.6 times 
that of Honduras, due to much lower labor productivity. Clearly, in addition to 
shop floor productivity enhancement programs, implementation of specific 
policies to improve labor productivity ranging from education, skills training and 
health policies are important.  
 
Finally, the last critical factor – product quality – underscores the rebirth of the 
Nigerian shrimp industry, which is making a profit thanks to the high quality of 
its exports to a growing European market. On the other hand, if Ghana wants to 
increase the profitability of its pineapple industry, it will have to start focusing on 
higher quality produce, through the implementation of standards and quality 
certification. 
 
As a final note, and more as a potential area for future research, it is important to 
point out that African countries not only look to Asia as potential markets; they 
also look at the Asia as a “model” for economic growth and development. One 
continuing and highly controversial point of contention is the importance of 
industrial policy in East Asia’s growth story. There is no doubt that, in addition to 
trade and capital market liberalizing measures, the state has played a key role in 
East Asia’s economic development since the 1970s. Although it is impossible to 
point out one or two successful policies in East Asia, and keeping in mind that 
both continents are radically different, the question we have to ask ourselves is 
what lessons – if any – could African governments learn from East Asia’s state 
involvement in their miraculous growth and poverty reduction? 
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